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EVIDENCE OF SPEED -

HIGHWAY RADAR

SALLY CAMPBELL

The problem of the highway speeder is almost as old as the automobile itself. With this problem came two others--one, the detection
of the speeding motorist, and two, the use of the means of detection as
evidence in convicting the offender. Through the years many devices
have been invented to determine the speed of an automobile. Some of
these have succeeded m the courtroom and are still used; others have
been determined inadmissible in evidence. Some of the means most
commonly used at the present time met with difficulty at first and in
some instances are still not enough in themselves to gain a conviction.
One of the earliest cases was Commonwealth v. Buxton' in which a
device known as a "Photo-Speed Recorder" was admitted in evidence
and the offending driver was convicted. The question reserved for the
court in that case was the competency of the "Photo-Speed Recorder."
Its operation consisted of taking two pictures from behind the automobile suspected of speeding, one picture taken a second later than the
other. The second picture would be smaller than the first because the
car would be moving away from the photographer. By measuring the
difference in size the distance the vehicle traveled during the interval
was determined by the photographic rule "that the distance of any
distant object from the lens of the camera is as many times greater
than the distance of the photograph from the lens as the length of any
line of the real object is greater than its length on the photograph. This
"' Modernly, of course, this seems like a
is a simple proportion.
roundabout way of determining the speed of a moving vehicle. But, as
will be seen, the view of the court in asking for an accurate means of
determining speed on the highways is still prevalent. The court, in
1910, said: "Indeed it would seem desirable to have some machine
whose action being dependent upon the uniform working of the laws
of nature would record the speed of a moving object."' But, unlike
some modern jurists, the same court had this to say about the means of
introducing the machine in evidence: "Nor is the fact that the experi1205 Mass. 49, 91 N.E. 128 (1910).
2Id.at 129.
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menter was not an expert fatal to the introduction of the machine." 4
Today one of the major problems in the introduction of the new radar
speedmeter is obtaining an expert to testify to its accuracy.
Since the time of the now obsolete "Photo-Speed Recorder" voluminous cases have been decided regarding the use of the speedometer in
the detection of the highway speeder. One of the earliest cases in this
field was a Washington case, Spokane v. Knight.' The question before
the court was whether there was sufficient evidence to show the defendant had been speeding. The arresting officer testified he took the
defendant's speed by a motorcycle on which he had a speedometer
which was tested three times a week. The defendant testified that he
had a speedometer which showed he was going less than the speed limit.
The court left it to the jury to decide whether the arresting officer's
speedometer was out of order. The jury found for the state and the conviction was sustained on appeal. An even earlier case came from Rhode
Island. In State v. Buchanan6 the defendant was convicted of speeding.
Here the defendant was trying to show his speedometer was accurate,
while no mention was made of the accuracy of the police speedometer.
The defendant tried to show through testimony of an expert witness
how many police departments throughout the country used the same
make of speedometer as the defendant had on his automobile. The court
held that such testimony did not show the accuracy of the speedometer
in general or of the particular speedometer belonging to the defendant.
Pennsylvania has had a great many cases on the introduction of the
reading of the police speedometer in evidence.7 In Commonwealth v.
Parish' the question of the accuracy of the arresting officer's speedometer seemed to be solved by allowing a certificate to be put in evidence stating his speedometer had been tested and found accurate
4 Ibid. But see State v. Buchanan, 32 R.I. 490, 79 Atl. 1114 (1911) ; People v.
Offermann, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1953).
596 Wash. 403, 165 Pac. 105 (1917).
c Note 4 supra.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Klick, 164 Pa. Super. 449, 65 A.2d 440 (1949) (use of
certificate for proving speeding in residential districts) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson,
4 Ches. Co. Rep. 134 (Pa., 1949) (the accuracy of the speedometer of the car of the
timing officer may also be established by the testimony of the proprietor and operator
of the official testing station) ; Commonwealth v. Adams, 23 Leh. Co. L.J. 381 (Pa.
Comm. P1. 1950) (proof of test of speedometer's accuracy can be made by officer
whose speedometer was tested); Commonwealth v. Cole, 61 D.&C. 548 (Pa. Quar.
Sess. 1948) (no conviction where the accused was timed by an officer whose speedometer had been tested for accuracy within thirty days, speeding in a residential section) ; Commonwealth v. Feyka, 62 D.&C. 353 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1948) (no evidence
of testing within thirty days). Also see Annotation, 21 A.L.R.2d 1200 (1952).
8 138 Pa. Super. 593, 10 A.2d 896 (1940).
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within thirty days before the arrest. A statute made such certificate
prima facie proof that the speedometer had been tested and that it
registered accurately.
The Prather speed device is another machine used in some states.
This device consists of a timer box carried in a police cruiser. There
is a second box called a road switch box placed on the side of the road.
A third unit is placed 366 feet and nine inches beyond the first box so
a car travelling at twenty-five miles per hour would take fen seconds
to reach the second box. A rubber hose across the highway starts the
timer when the front wheels hit the hose. It is stopped when the front
wheels hit the hose of the second box and the speed of the vehicle can
be determined by reference to a chart.- The court held in Carrierv.
Comonwealth9 that the reading by the officers was admissible since it
was established by proof that the device when used to test the defendant's speed was mechanically sufficient.
Today the clocking with the police speedometer and such machines
as the Prather speed device are being partially replaced in some statds
by the electronic speedmeter. "Radar" on the highways -works as
follows:
The radar box consists of two antennas, one a sending or transmitting
antenna, and one a receiving antenna. The receiving antenna is connected to an electric speedmeter and to a graph machine which graph
machine makes a written record of each car passing within the scope of
the radar equipment. The operating area of the equipment is several
hundred feet, depending upon the height of the equipment and the angle
on which it is placed along the road. When the power supply is connected, the machine is ready for testing and operation ....
Actual operation of the radar equipment consists of sending a wave or
ray of radio energy down the roadway on the sending or transmitting
antenna which wave is reflected off an oncoming car back to the receiver
antenna .... The sending wave is sent out on one frequency, the deflected
or received wave comes back on a different and higher frequency which is
translated into miles per hour by the electric speedmeter which measures
the difference in the frequencies of the transmitted wave and the received
wave. A written recording is made at the same time on a graph machine.
The radar operator then identifies and describes the oncoming vehicle
and informs the intercepting officers by radio communication of any
speeding violations.'0
Radar received a setback in People v. Offerman."1 In that case the
question before the court was the admissibility in evidence of the read0 242 S.W.2d 633 (Ky., Ct. of Appeals 1951).
1o State v. Dantonio, 105 A.2d 918, 920 (N.J., 1954).
1204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S..2d 179 (1953).
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ing of the radar device purporting to record the speed of the defendant's
automobile. The state relied entirely on the reading of the speedmeter.
The trial court made three errors in basing its conviction on such
reading.
First, the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony regarding
the testing of the radar device by the two police officers. The radar
car operator testified that the dial reading agreed with the speedometer
reading of the pick-up car as reported by the other arresting officer.
The court termed this hearsay because each officer relied on what the
other said when he testified that the speedometer and the radar dial
agreed, since neither knew that they both agreed by their own knowledge. However, the court indicated that this obstacle could be eliminated if records had been kept and thus fall into the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.
Second, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to allow a police
officer having no experience with radar to testify as to his opinion as
to the accuracy of the device. The trial court made its third error on
the same subject of the accuracy of the radar equipment. The trial
judge commented on his own pre-trial experiment made in his own car.
This was held inadmissible because it was an unauthorized view, based
on hearsay and his private knowledge was not proper for judicial notice.
The last two grounds for reversal mentioned above cannot be questioned. But, as to the hearsay point a different view has been taken in
State v. Dantonio.1 2 In relation to this point the testimony of the
officers in relation to the pre-arrest tests was held to be admissible.
The view taken was that each officer testified to independent facts,
(1) the speed of the patrol car and (2) the reading of the graph; and
the court held that the radio communication between the two officers
was merely incidental. The requirements of expert testimony were also
satisfied. The expert who testified had a Bachelor's Degree and a
Doctor's Degree in engineering and he stated that the radar equipment
was accurate within two miles per hour either way. He also stated that
any defects in the equipment at the time of the arrest would resolve
in favor of the motorist.
On the judicial notice point that was raised in People v. Offermann,"
the holding in that case was given added force in People v. Beck." In
the latter case it was held to be error to take judicial notice of the
12 105 A.2d 918 (N.J., 1954). Accord, People v. Katz, 129 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Ct. of
Spec. Sess. 1954) ; People v. Sarver, 205 Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1954).
13 Note 4 supra.
14 205 Misc. 757, 130 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1954).
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operation and accuracy of radar devices to establish the speed of the
defendant's automobile. It was stated that this was not the proper
subject of judicial notice at this time since it was not yet the general
knowledge of the country nor a practical application of scientific facts
generally known or which ought to be known.
In Delaware the radar reading alone is sufficient to give a conviction
if the jury finds that at the time of the arrest the equipment was properly functioning, properly operated, in fact an accurate recorder of
speed and the accuracy had been tested within a reasonable time of
its use.15
In Washington there is as yet no judicial determination as to the
admissibility of the radar reading. Washington would, of course, have
the same problems as the other states have had regarding hearsay, expert testimony and judicial notice. The Attorney General, however,
thinks that the only question would be under RCW 46.48.120." As
to this point it is his opinion that the legislature's purpose in passing
the statute was to eliminate the element of human error. As to the
Electromatic Radar Speed Meter used in Washington he had this to
say:
[In this device] ...the calculation of speed is not based upon the lapsed
time required to traverse a measured course. Lapsed time is an element
in the operation of the instrument, but it is the time required for the return
of the radio signal which is the factor rather than the time required for
the vehicle to cover a given distance. The continuous change of the
vehicle's position is automatically converted to a reading on the calibrated
dial in terms of miles per hour. The speed reading on the instrument
is instantaneous and continuous. There is no mathematical formula by
which the officer or anyone else calculates the speed. There is here no
possibility of human error, particularly where the reading graph is used.
This device is clearly outside the scope of the statutory definition.'
Even with all the newness and problems connected with it, it is
submitted that highway radar is here to stay, in Washington as elsewhere.
15 State v. Moffitt, 100 A2d 778 (Del., 1953) ; noted in 15 OHio ST. 223.
'a"No evidence as to the speed of any vehicle.., shall be admitted in evidence in
any court at a subsequent trial of such person in case such evidence relates to or is

based upon the maintenance or use of a speed trap. A "speed trap," within the meaning
of this section, is a particular section of or distance on any public highway, the length
of which has been measured off or otherwise designated or determined, and the limits

of which are within the vision of any officer or officers who calculate the speed of a
vehicle passing through such speed trap by using the lapsed time during which such
vehicle travels between the entrance of such speed trap: Provided,-thatevidence shall
be admissible . . if the same [speed] is determined . . . by a mechanical, electrical,
or other device . . within an error.of not to exceed 5 percent...
17 AGO 53-55 No. 167 (1953).

